CHINA’S WAPI POLICY: SECURITY MEASURE
OR TRADE PROTECTIONISM?
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ABSTRACT
In December of 2003, the Chinese government announced
that all WLAN equipment sold in China must conform to a
propriety standard called WAPI, rather than the internationally
accepted Wi-Fi standard. Moreover, for foreign firms to gain
access to WAPI technology, they would need to partner with one
of two-dozen Chinese firms designated by the Chinese
government. The policy ostensibly grew out of security concerns
regarding Wi-Fi, although it is unclear whether WAPI is more
secure. Beijing has now indefinitely postponed the
implementation of this policy, but WAPI is still relevant. This
iBrief argues that WAPI is illustrative of many Chinese technical
barriers to trade in the high-tech sector, and evaluates this
policy’s consistency with China’s WTO obligations.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Those with an interest in international trade have long wistfully
thought of China as the last frontier. “For 700 years, ever since outsiders
first started writing about the place, the western world has believed that
there are untold riches to be garnered in China.”2 Once China joined the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) in 2001,3 investors and exporters
hoped the heretofore-elusive market of more than a billion potential
consumers would finally be cracked open.4
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Since China’s accession to the WTO, U.S. exports to China have
increased dramatically from less than $15 billion in 2001 to
approximately $35 billion in 2004, elevating China to the fifth largest
export market of the U.S.5 However, it is still difficult to penetrate some
areas of the Chinese market, “particularly where innovation or
technology play a key role.”6 For example, China’s 17 percent valueadded tax (“VAT”) on semiconductors raised the ire of U.S. industry and
trade officials because tax rebates were awarded to domestic
semiconductor producers that allowed these companies to pay no more
than 6 percent VAT fees.7 Since this practice put the domestic industry at
a competitive advantage vis-à-vis imports,8 the U.S. requested formal
consultations with China at the WTO in March, 20049—a precursor to a
complaint being lodged—but the parties resolved the issue
diplomatically.10 China’s WAPI policy can be viewed through the same
lens: another example of Chinese barriers to trade in the high-tech sector.
WAPI refers to a proprietary standard for wireless technologies, the use
of which China announced it would require for all wireless products sold
in China, rather than the widely-used Wi-Fi standard. This iBrief argues
that China’s WAPI policy is inconsistent with its WTO obligations.
¶2

I. CHINA’S WAPI POLICY
¶3
In late 2003, the Chinese government announced that, as of June
1, 2004, all Wireless Local Area Network (“WLAN”) equipment sold
within China would have to comply with a new encryption standard:
Wireless LAN Authentication and Privacy Infrastructure (“WAPI”).11

5

United States Trade Representative, 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CHINA’S
WTO COMPLIANCE 4 (2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2004/Section_Ind
ex.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) [hereinafter 2004 REPORT].
6
Id. at 5.
7
See, e.g., Mike Clendenin, U.S. Readies Complaint to WTO on China Tax,
ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Mar. 17, 2004, available at
http://www.eetimes.com/semi/news/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=UDRXG22M
3KJ1EQSNDBGCKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleID=18400554 (last visited Feb. 7,
2005).
8
Tim Beyers, America’s Chip Crusade, THE MOTLEY FOOL, Mar. 19, 2004, at
http://www.fool.com/news/mft/2004/mft04031919.htm (last visited Feb. 7,
2005).
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Request for Consultation by the United States, (Mar. 23, 2004).
10
2004 REPORT, supra note 5, at 37.
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Sumner Lemon, Controversy Over Chinese WLAN Standard Deepens, IDG
NEWS SERVICE, Dec. 10, 2003, at
http://www.infoworld.com/article/03/12/10/HNchinesecontroversy_1.html (last
visited Feb. 6, 2005).

2005

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 18

WLAN is a generic term that refers to the linking of computers to
communicate with each other by using high frequency radio signals that
transmit and receive data.12 The global WLAN standard developed by the
independent Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”) is
Wireless Fidelity (“Wi-Fi”), also known as 802.11.13 The China
Broadband Wireless Internet Protocol Standards (“BWIPS”) group
developed WAPI to remedy what it perceived as security flaws in the
encryption ability of Wi-Fi.14
¶4
Unlike Wi-Fi, the algorithm of which is available through the
IEEE to anyone for free,15 WAPI is a proprietary standard. Thus, to gain
access to WAPI, foreign firms must acquire a license through
negotiations with any one of two dozen Chinese firms designated by the
Chinese government.16 This feature quickly led to questions regarding
Chinese sincerity. “‘Whatever national-security argument there may be
for encryption, the real motivator is to promote the interests of certain
Chinese companies over other companies,’ said Ann Stevenson-Yang,
the managing director of the U.S. Information Technology Office in
Beijing.”17
¶5
The wireless industry expressed almost immediate concern
regarding the WAPI policy. For instance, Intel Corp. announced in
March, 2004 that it would stop shipping Wi-Fi chips to China by May of
that year because the perceived benefits of accessing the Chinese market
did not outweigh the company’s concerns about the new policy.18 Even
companies that decided to comply with WAPI were not without
trepidation, as the potential remained for Chinese firms to extort

12

See http://www.wordreference.com/definition/local%5Farea%5Fnetwork, see
also
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/wireless%5Flocal%5Farea%5Fnetwor
k (last visited Feb. 6, 2005) (definitions of LAN and WLAN).
13
Lemon, supra note 11.
14
Patrick Mannion and Mike Clendenin, China Throws Wi-Fi a Curve, ELEC.
ENG’G TIMES, Dec. 22-29, 2003, at 1, available at
http://www.eetimes.com/story/OEG20031222S0004 (last visited Feb. 7, 2005).
15
IEEE Standards Association, at http://standards.ieee.org/getieee802/ (“This
program grants public access to view and download current individual IEEE
Local and Metropolitan Area Network standards at no charge”) (last visited Feb.
7, 2005).
16
Intel Tells China: No More Chips, INTERNETNEWS.COM, March 11, 2004, at
http://www.internetnews.com/wireless/article.php/3324601 (last visited Dec. 2,
2004) [hereinafter No More Chips].
17
Mannion and Clendenin, supra note 14, at 58.
18
No More Chips, supra note 16 (stating that other companies, like Broadcom,
also decided to stop selling in China because of the WAPI policy, despite the
large market).
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technology transfers from foreign wireless companies in return for access
to WAPI. 19
¶6
There are many potential negative consequences of China’s
WAPI policy. First, because the industry loses economies of scale
associated with a single global standard, WAPI might raise costs for all
wireless chip producers.20 Second, wireless manufacturers are worried
that the way in which the Chinese government chose to implement the
WAPI policy—through mandatory licensing from Chinese firms—would
constitute an anti-competitive practice.21 Because foreign companies
must negotiate licenses with Chinese firms, who are potential
competitors, it might be difficult to secure access to the Chinese market.
Chinese companies could also engage in price gouging by charging high
prices for the WAPI standard to inhibit foreign firms’ ability to enter the
Chinese market. Even worse, the Chinese firms might condition access to
WAPI on foreign firms agreeing to share valuable intellectual property
with their Chinese counterparts.22 Some industry insiders even predict
that the WAPI policy would require all manufacture of WAPI-based
wireless products to move inside China’s borders because WAPI
technology cannot leave the country.23

Responding to industry concerns, the U.S. government stepped
in, writing a letter to Chinese Vice Premier Zeng Peiyan that noted its
concerns regarding the WAPI policy.24 The U.S. government was
especially concerned that the licensing feature might require transfer of
technology from foreign firms to Chinese competitors.25 The U.S. urged
China to reconsider its WAPI policy, noting that the new rule “would
¶7

19

See id.
Lemon, supra note 11 (noting the IEEE’s concerns regarding WAPI’s
potential to undermine standardization).
21
China Regulations: A New Flap Over WAPI Standards, EIU VIEWSWIRE,
Mar. 17, 2004 [hereinafter New Flap Over WAPI].
22
Id.
23
Michael Kanellos, Divide Between U.S. Tech Firms, China—A Great Wall?,
CNET NEWS.COM, March 19, 2004, at
http://news.com.com/Divide+between+U.S.+tech+firms%2C+China-a+great+wall/2100-1006_3-5175837.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2005) (predicting
that the hours of work to test each wireless product must be done inside China).
24
See Letter From Bush Administration Officials to Beijing Protesting Wi-Fi
Encryption Standards, BUSINESSWEEK ONLINE, Mar. 15, 2004, at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_11/b3874018.htm (last
visited Feb. 7, 2005) (for a reprinting of the letter, signed by U.S. Trade
Representative Robert Zoellick, Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans, and
Secretary of State Colin Powell) [hereinafter Bush Administration Letter].
25
See id.
20
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appear to be inconsistent with China’s WTO commitments.”26 Officials
from both countries met in April 2004, and China agreed to suspend
indefinitely implementation of the WAPI policy.27

II. IS WAPI CONSISTENT WITH CHINA’S WTO OBLIGATIONS?
¶8
Although it appears that, at least for now, Beijing will not
enforce a WAPI standard on wireless products sold in China, analyzing
whether WAPI is consistent with China’s WTO obligations is still
valuable. First, China might succumb to domestic industry pressure and
reintroduce the WAPI policy. Second, this analysis will likely have
bearing on other Chinese high-tech sector policies in the years to come.
This section will evaluate the WAPI policy in terms of China’s WTO
obligations, particularly those found in the Agreement on Technical
Barriers to Trade28 (“TBT”) and the National Treatment requirement
found in Article III of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(“GATT”). This section also analyzes whether, in the event of a
violation, China’s WAPI policy is excused by the general exceptions
found in GATT Article XX or the security exceptions of Article XXI.

A. The Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade precludes
government actions like China’s WAPI policy.
¶9
The TBT “establishes rules and procedures regarding the
development, adoption and application of … standards … to prevent the
use of technical requirements as unnecessary barriers to trade.”29 One of
the stated goals of the TBT is harmonization of national regulatory
frameworks as a means of “improving efficiency of production and
facilitating the conduct of international trade.”30 While the GATT is best
described as a system of negative integration, which states what
countries are not allowed to do, the TBT is closer to positive
integration—mandating what governments must do. The TBT
accomplishes this by requiring countries to follow international technical

26

Id.
Mike Clendenin, Beijing Backs Off Proprietary Spec for Wireless LANs,
ELEC. ENG’G TIMES, Apr, 26, 2004, at 1, available at
http://www.eet.com/issue/fp/showArticle.jhtml;jsessionid=TUROV2SMQPRV
KQSNDBCCKHSCJUMEKJVN?articleId=19200140&kc=6256 (last visited
Feb. 7, 2005).
28
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, April 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, LEGAL
INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/17-tbt_e.htm [hereinafter TBT
Agreement].
29
2004 REPORT, supra note 5, at 40.
30
TBT Agreement pmbl., para. 3.
27
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standards where they exist, and by justifying deviations from those
standards in certain circumstances.31 Thus, where the TBT applies, it is
perhaps more restrictive than the GATT.
For a measure to fall within the purview of the TBT, it must be a
“technical regulation.”32 The three criteria of technical regulations were
set out by the Appellate Body in EC – Sardines:33
¶10

1. The measure “must apply to an identifiable product
or group of products”;
2. The measure “must lay down one or more
characteristics of the product”; and
3. “[C]ompliance with the product characteristics must
be mandatory.”34
¶11
The WAPI policy would thus fall under the TBT. WAPI applies
to an identifiable group of products (wireless products) and sets out
characteristics of those products; namely, that they must comply with the
WAPI proprietary standard. The third criterion of a technical regulation
is also met: compliance with WAPI is mandatory if companies wish to
sell inside of China.35
¶12
Because WAPI does not comply with the requirements of the
TBT, requiring the standard runs afoul of the TBT. The TBT
“recognizes the important role that international standards play in
promoting harmonization and facilitating trade.”36 To that end, where
“relevant international standards exist . . . Members shall use them as a
basis for their technical regulations except when such international
standards . . . would be ineffective or inappropriate means for the
fulfillment of the legitimate objectives pursued.”37 This means that where
an international standard exists, and that standard would be effective in
accomplishing a government’s legitimate regulatory objectives, the
international standard must be used. Because requirements attach where
an international standard exists, a question arises as to whether Wi-Fi
falls into that category.

31

Id. at art. 2.4.
GATT Dispute Appellate Body Report on European Communities Trade
Description of Sardines, WT/DS231/AB/R, para. 175 (Sept. 26, 2002)
[hereinafter EC – Sardines].
33
Id., para. 176.
34
Id.
35
See id.
36
Id., para. 214.
37
TBT Agreement art. 2.4.
32
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The TBT defines a standard as a “[d]ocument approved by a
recognized body, that provides … rules, guidelines or characteristics for
products or related processes and production methods.”38 The Appellate
Body in EC – Sardines rejected the EC’s argument that an international
standard requires consensus.39 Thus, the test for whether a standard exists
turns on whether a “‘recognized body’ of the international
standardization community” adopted it, not whether all parties agreed to
such a standard.40 In the area of wireless technologies, Wi-Fi is an
international standard. Wi-Fi was “recently elevated to International
Organization for Standardization status.”41 As the EC – Sardines case
makes clear, China’s lack of acceptance of Wi-Fi does not change this
conclusion. Because an international standard exists, China is obligated
to base its regulations on the standard unless Wi-Fi “would be an
ineffective or inappropriate means for the fulfillment of legitimate
objectives.”42
¶13

¶14
The professed purpose behind China’s WAPI policy is a concern
about the security of Wi-Fi.43 To successfully challenge China’s use of
the WAPI standard, a complainant must show that Wi-Fi is “[]effective
or []appropriate”44 for addressing those concerns.45 To do so, a
complainant should highlight that (a) the rest of the world believes Wi-Fi
to be sufficiently secure, and (b) it is unclear whether WAPI is more
secure than Wi-Fi. If a complainant can show that Wi-Fi satisfies China’s
objectives, the very imposition of a WAPI standard would violate Article
2.4 of the TBT.46
¶15
Failing to find a violation of Article 2.4 of the TBT, there is a
supplementary ground on which to challenge the Chinese WAPI policy.
The TBT imposes an additional obligation on Members to ensure that
“technical regulations shall not be more trade-restrictive than necessary
to fulfill a legitimate objective.”47 There is perhaps an independent claim
to make that the manner in which China chose to implement its WAPI
38

Id. at Annex 1, Terms and Their Definitions for the Purpose of this
Agreement, para. 2.
39
EC – Sardines, supra note 32, at para. 218. See id., para. 222 (“consensus is
not required for standards adopted by the international standardizing
community”).
40
Id., para. 227.
41
See id.
42
See TBT Agreement art. 2.4.
43
Mannion and Clendenin, supra note 14, at 58.
44
See TBT Agreement art. 2.4.
45
See EC – Sardines, supra note 32, at para. 275 (“it is for . . . the complaining
Member . . . to bear the burden of proving its claim”).
46
See TBT Agreement art. 2.4.
47
Id. at art. 2.4.
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policy, requiring foreign manufacturers to negotiate licenses with a
limited number of Chinese firms, is more trade-restrictive than necessary
to accomplish its information security objective. For instance, the
government itself could have granted licenses on a non-discriminatory
basis to any company that wished to manufacture wireless equipment for
the Chinese market. Thus, even if the Chinese government is warranted
in mandating WAPI, the licensing requirements might nonetheless
violate Beijing’s obligations under the TBT.

B. China’s WAPI policy could also be challenged successfully
under GATT’s National Treatment obligation.
¶16
In addition to the TBT, China’s WAPI policy possibly runs afoul
of the National Treatment obligation found in GATT Article III:448
because WAPI treats domestic wireless manufacturers differently from
foreign companies. GATT Article III:4 requires that the products made
by foreign companies “be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements . . . .”49 A complainant who brings such a
challenge must show:

1. That the domestic and foreign products in question
are “like products”;
2. That the measure “affects” the product’s internal
sale; and
3. That the imported product is treated “less favorably”
than the like domestic product.50
¶17
Four criteria are used to determine if products are “like”:
physical properties of the product, end-uses in a given market, consumer
perceptions, and tariff classification.51 If products are “like,” the measure
affects the sale, and imported products are treated less favorably than
domestic products, a National Treatment violation exists.
¶18
Here, the WAPI policy arguably violates China’s National
Treatment obligations by giving domestic wireless manufacturers an
advantage vis-à-vis their foreign competitors. First, Wi-Fi products are
48

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947 [hereinafter
“GATT”], art. III:4 (1994).
49
Id.
50
GATT Dispute Appellate Body Report on Korea Measures Affecting Imports
of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R, WT/DS169/AB/R, para.
133 (Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea – Beef].
51
GATT Dispute Appellate Body Report on European Communities Measures
Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R, para.
85 (Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EC – Asbestos].
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like WAPI products. Their physical characteristics are similar, they have
common end-uses, and consumers almost certainly perceive the two
standards as comparable.52 Second, the WAPI policy obviously affects
the sale of Wi-Fi within China: it precludes it. This, in turn, meets the
third requirement for a National Treatment violation by creating less
favorable treatment for foreign Wi-Fi products.53 Therefore, it is
plausible that China’s implementation of WAPI violates its National
Treatment obligation.54
¶19
China might argue that even if a National Treatment violation
has occurred, it is excused by the Article XX General Exceptions, or the
Article XXI Security Exceptions. Article XX allows countries to violate
their WTO commitments in limited circumstances, such as when the
measure is “necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations
which are not inconsistent” with GATT.55 The regulating country must
still show that the measure is not applied in a discriminatory fashion.56
GATT also contains a circumscribed exception for national security,
which states that, “[n]othing in this Agreement shall be construed to
require any contracting party to furnish any information . . . it considers
contrary to its essential security interests.”57

Here, however, the WAPI policy is not excused by the General
Exceptions found in Article XX. Even if requiring WAPI and banning
Wi-Fi secures compliance with the Chinese information-security
objectives, Beijing would fail the “necessary” prong of the analysis.58
The Chinese government could not show that the WAPI policy is
necessary to accomplish that objective. When determining if a measure is
necessary, the WTO evaluates the importance of the interest at stake,
how well the challenged measure contributes to the ends pursued, and
what effect the measure has on trade.59 Also pertinent is whether there
¶20

52

See EC – Asbestos, supra note 51, para. 101.
See Korea – Beef, supra note 50, para. 133.
54
An additional argument could be made that even if Wi-Fi is not like WAPI,
foreign WAPI products are disadvantaged, as compared to domestic products,
because foreign companies are required to negotiate licenses for the WAPI
standard while the Chinese government gives domestic firms access to WAPI. In
the extreme, a foreign firm might be excluded from China altogether if no firm
with access to WAPI is willing to grant a license. See GATT art. III:4. In fact,
one might expect the difficulty in obtaining a license to correlate with a firm’s
prior competitiveness within China. More competitive firms would have greater
difficulty securing WAPI technology from competitors.
55
Id. at art. XX:(d).
56
Id. at art. XX (known as the “chapeau”).
57
Id. at art. XXI:(a).
58
See id. at art. XX:(d).
59
Korea – Beef, supra note 50, para. 166.
53
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exists an alternative that is consistent with GATT obligations.60 In
addition, the measure must not be applied in an arbitrary or
discriminatory manner.
Because WAPI probably does not satisfy the rigorous
requirements of the exceptions to the GATT, any violations to the TBT
or GATT Article III:3 would most likely not be excused. For example,
protecting information security is an important government interest;
however, it is unclear if WAPI is more secure than the default standard,
Wi-Fi. What is clear is that the WAPI measure would disrupt trade in
wireless products, at least until foreign manufacturers could negotiate
licenses to comply with WAPI. Also damaging to China’s case is their
unilateral action61 in the face of international pressure to work with the
IEEE to improve Wi-Fi security.62 It is likely that these factors combined
would prevent China from successfully defending its WAPI policy using
the exceptions found in Article XX.
¶21

¶22
Even if China could convince the WTO that WAPI is necessary
to protect one of the enumerated governmental objectives, the policy
would probably still fail, as it is applied in a discriminatory manner.63
Only domestic companies are freely given the WAPI standard, whereas
foreign firms must negotiate to gain access to it.64 This characteristic of
the WAPI policy is at the heart of what National Treatment proscribes,
and the exceptions do not excuse such discrimination.

Perhaps the security exceptions found in Article XXI could
excuse China’s potential violations from the WAPI policy. There is no
case law interpreting the circumstances under which the security
exceptions may be applied.65 National security is an elastic concept that
¶23

60

Id.
That the United States unilaterally imposed a standard, rather than negotiated
with its trading partners to find an acceptable solution to the problem of sea
turtle conservation was significant to finding a WTO violation in the Shrimp
Turtle case. See GATT Dispute Panel Report On U.S. Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R, para. 166 (May. 15,
1998).
62
See Mannion and Clendenin, supra note 14, at 58 (calling out to China to
“‘come and help us [the 802.11 working group] enhance it’”).
63
See id. at art. XX (requiring that such measures undertaken for legitimate
purposes “not [be] applied in a manner which would constitute a means of
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination”).
64
No More Chips, supra note 16.
65
However, the United States threatened to invoke Article XXI over trade
restrictions it imposed on Cuba (the parties eventually settled). See generally
August Reinish, Widening the US Embargo Against Cuba Extraterritorially, 5
61
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changes over time, especially in light of the recent growth in global
terrorism. Information security takes on a renewed significance under
these circumstances. Perhaps China, arguing that it can be the sole judge
of what measures are necessary to protect Chinese national security,
would prevail in a challenge to the WAPI measures.66 Yet, too expansive
a reading of the national security exceptions might facilitate cheating by
Members, undermining the obligations imposed by the WTO system.

III. PLACING WAPI IN CONTEXT: OTHER CHINESE POLICIES IN THE
HIGH-TECH SECTOR
When thinking about how to categorize China’s WAPI policy,
whether as a legitimate response to security concerns or a veiled attempt
at protecting domestic industry, one should place this individual policy
within a broader context. WAPI is only one of many examples of
Chinese protectionism in its high-tech sector.67
¶24

¶25
As previously discussed, China’s discriminatory VAT policy in
the semiconductor industry could have been the template followed for
the WAPI policy. In both instances, facially neutral measures were used
to further the underlying industrial policy of promoting domestic
industry at the expense of foreign counterparts. In addition, both policies
were withdrawn only after increased U.S. pressure that included threats
of recourse to the WTO.

A recurring theme in Chinese industrial policy is the push to
develop new standards and parallel technologies. For instance, the
Chinese government, tired of paying large royalties to the DVD
consortium, partially funded the development of the Enhanced Versatile
Disk (“EVD”) to compete with the international standard.68 China also
launched a homegrown standard for 3G cellular phones, TD-SCDMA.69
¶26

EUR. J. INT’L L. 545 (1994), available at
http://www.ejil.org/journal/Vol7/No4/art6-07.html.
66
See id. at 545 (laying out the argument that national security is “autodetermined”).
67
See New Flap Over WAPI, supra note 21 (noting that “this is not an isolated
event. . . . China has adopted a number of policies aimed at boosting homegrown technologies at the expense of those offered by foreign companies”).
68
Larry Magid, Chinese Government to Develop Alternative to DVD – EVD, PC
ANSWER.COM, Nov. 27, 2003, at
http://www.pcanswer.com/articles/synd_china.htm (last visited May 31, 2005).
69
See Andrew Orlowski, Trade Wars II: China Shuns Qualcom—No CDMA
Tax!, THE REGISTER, Nov. 23, 2002, available at
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/11/23/trade_wars_ii_china_shuns/print.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2005).
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Promoting the development of new standards is not problematic
per se; the competition among standards is at the core of technological
progress and innovation. However, China’s decision to unilaterally
mandate which standard must be used within its borders slips into trade
obstruction.70 In addition, China hopes to parlay success on the domestic
front to influence which standards are adopted on a global scale.71 Hence,
“China is trying to use the size of its market and a proprietary standard to
leverage control of the wireless sector.”72 This is of particular concern if,
due to the underlying cost structure of the market, there is only room for
one global standard. An aggressive industrial policy might crowd-out
other standards, despite the relative advantages of each contender. China
has thus shown itself to be active in molding industrial policy in its hightech sector in non-neutral ways.
¶27

CONCLUSION
¶28
Although each of China’s policies in the high-tech sector may be
individually be excused, China’s WAPI policy seems to be a clear case
of excessive protectionism. China’s stance on WAPI furthers its national
policy of promoting the interests of domestic manufacturers at the
expense of their foreign competitors. Now that China has become a
member of the WTO, its international treaty obligations, such as those
provided by GATT and TBT, might preclude such industrial policies.
Although WAPI has now faded from international attention after last
year’s diplomatic settlement, this author would wager that the future will
bring further attempts by Beijing to unilaterally impose protectionist
policies on others in the high tech sector.
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See supra, § II.
Bradford Brown, Joining WTO Means Playing By Global Rules,
INFORMATIONWEEK, April 5, 2004, at 70, available at
http://www.informationweek.com/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=18700337 (last
visited May 31, 2005).
72
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